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FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM: 
A REPLY TO GALE 
John Martin Fischer 
Richard Gale contends that my arguments against the "Ockhamist" reply to 
the argument for the incompatibility of Cod's foreknowledge and human 
freedom depend on problematic inferences involving the notion of "bring-
ing about" a proposition. I point out that my arguments do not rest on such 
inferences, and I seek to clarify what I take to be the basic thrust of the argu-
ment for incompatibilism. This argument does not rest on the impossiblity 
of backward causation, but the implausibility of supposing that we can 
have it in our power so to act that the past would have been different from 
what it actually was. 
In his probing and suggestive piece, "Divine Omniscience, Human 
Freedom, and Backward Causation," Richard Gale raises many intriguing 
issues; in the brief space allotted to me here, I can only address a few points 
(and in a somewhat schematic way). Gale lays out a version of an impor-
tant argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human 
freedom (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities). He then con-
tends that my arguments against the "Ockhamist" reply to this basic argu-
ment are unconvincing insofar as they rely on certain allegedly problematic 
inferences involving the notion of "bringing about" a proposition. 
On Gale's interpretation, the Ockhamist allows for an agent (sometimes) 
to bring it about that God held a different belief from the one He actually 
held, since to do so is simply to bring about a temporally impure proposi-
tion about the past. Gale claims that I have argued that in the context of 
God's prior beliefs, to bring about an impure proposition about the past 
implies that one bring about a pure proposition about the past, which is 
ruled out on the Ockhamist's own assumptions. Further, Gale suggests a 
characterization of the problematic distinction between temporally pure 
and impure propositions, to which he refers in laying out the alleged struc-
ture of my argument against Ockhamism. 
For example, Gale claims that J argue that if an agent can bring it about 
that God believed at tl that p (a temporally impure proposition, insofar as p 
is assumed to pertain to the future relative to tl), then he can bring it about 
that someone believed at tl that p (a temporally pure proposition). Here 
Gale supposes that my inference depends on a principle expressing the clo-
sure of "brings it about that _" under deduction. Additionally, Gale imag-
ines that God is Bob's favorite object. Now if an agent can bring it about 
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that God believed at tl that p, then this agent can bring it about that Bob's 
favorite object believed at tl that p (a temporally pure proposition). Gale 
supposes that my inference here depends on a principle stating that "core-
porting propositions are inter-substitutable salve veritate," and thus are so 
inter-substitutable within the context of "brings it about that_fl. 
Finally, Gale points out that I assume (for the sake of my argument) that 
God's believing that p involves God's mind being in a representational state 
S. He points out that I argue that if an agent can bring it about that God 
believes at tl that p, then the agent can bring it about that God's mind is in 
representational state S at tl. Gale states that God's mind's being at tl in 
representational state S is a pure proposition (relative to tl). Again, he con-
tends that my inference depends on a principle of closure of "brings it about 
that _", where the closure here pertains to co-reporting propositions. 
In the above cases, Gale rejects the allegedly problematic results by 
rejecting the inferences; he contends that "brings it about that _" is an 
opaque context, and thus the inferences in question are invalid. In reply I 
would first point out that 1 do not consider the results mentioned by Gale 
genuinely problematic for the Ockhamist. This is because I do not believe 
that the relevant propositions (such as the proposition that someone 
believes at t1 that p) are genuinely temporally pure (in the relevant con-
texts). This calls into question Gale's account of the distinction between 
pure and impure propositions, to the extent that his account seems to 
imply that at least his first two putatively problematic propositions are 
pure. Further, I shall point out that my pattern of argumentation against 
Ockhamism does not need to employ any sort of problematic inference 
concerning "bringing it about that _"; for example, the argument can be 
developed simply employing facts about the relationship between counter-
factuals and "can-claims" (claims about the relevant sort of freedom). 
Suppose that an agent can bring it about that God believed at tl that p. 
Does it follow that this agent can bring it about that someone believed at tl 
that p? It is not obvious, since there may be others who so believed at tl, 
and the mere fact that the agent can perform an action sufficient for the 
obtaining of some proposition cannot imply that the agent can bring about 
that proposition, on Gale's own account. (After all, Gale says, "If brings it 
about that _' were closed under deduction, it would follow that, since a 
necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, 1 can bring it about 
that 2+2=4 if I can bring it about that any proposition is true," a fact Gale 
takes to be a reductio of the closure claim.) 
But grant that (in a certain context) the agent can indeed bring it about 
that someone believed at t1 that p by bringing it about that God so 
believed. My view is that this is no problem for the Ockhamist, since in the 
circumstances the someone in question is God. That is, in the relevant con-
text, "Someone believed at tl that p" is indeed a temporally impure propo-
sition, because it is made true by God's so believing. Any account of the 
temporally pure/impure distinction that does not capture this intuition 
(such as Gale's) is inadequate. ' A similar point applies to "Bob's favorite 
object believed at t1 that p." Thus far, in my view, there is no problem for 
Ockhamism, nor any problem for the relevant inference principles involv-
ing "brings it about that _". 
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Note that I distinguish between two conceptions of "God." If "God" is 
taken to be a role term, and "Yahweh" names the individual who actual-
ly-but not necessarily-occupies this role, then I claim that "God believed 
at t1 that p" is a "hard-core soft fact."2 Put in Gale's framework, this 
implies that in the relevant sort of context, if an agent can perform an act 
which is such that if he were to perform it, God would have believed at n 
that p, then the agent can perform an act which is such that if he were to 
perform it, Yahweh would have believed at n that p. In the relevant con-
text, then, the agent would be so acting that some genuinely pure proposi-
tion (about the past) would have obtained. 
So suppose that p states the actual truth about how an agent will behave 
at a time subsequent to n. If the agent nevertheless can do otherwise, then 
he can perform some action which is such that if he were to perform it, 
Yahweh would not have believed at t1 that p. The above is enough to gen-
erate my argument; the only resources I use are facts about counterfactuals 
and their relationship to "can-claims," and not inferences involving "brings 
it about that _". The basic intuition that drives my argument here is that 
no one has it in his power at a given time t so to act that some temporally 
pure fact about a time prior to t which actually obtained would not have 
obtained.' (If, on the other hand, "God" is taken to be a name of an indi-
vidual who essentially has the Divine Attributes, then I claim that "God 
believed at t1 that p" is a "hard-type soft fact."4 I will explain this in what 
follows, as it applies to Gale's argument about my conception of God's 
beliefs as involving representational states.) 
Gale points out that my argument assumes what he calls the "quite 
dubious" proposition that Cod cannot have a belief unless his mind is in 
some sort of representational state. I grant that this assumption is con-
tentious. I would suggest however that this assumption specifies a signifi-
cant way in which Cod's beliefs and human beliefs might be thought to be 
similar; when one gives it up, one at least moves toward a notion of Divine 
belief that is so different from human belief as (arguably) to involve a dif-
ferent sense. And one of Nelson Pike's main contentions was that his argu-
ment showed the incompatibility of God's prior beliefs and human free 
action, where God is said to have beliefs in the same sense as humans." 
Gale says that I claim that if God's believing at t1 that p is identical with 
Cod's mind at t1 being in representational state 5, then if an agent can 
bring it about that God believed at t1 that p, then the agent can bring it 
about that Cod's mind at t1 is in S. Gale further claims that this latter fact 
is temporally pure. 
I do not know why Gale supposes that the proposition that God's mind 
at t1 is in a representational state S (a state that represents the world as 
being such as to render p true) is temporally pure. It would seem that both 
intuitively and on his own criterion, this would tum out to be a temporally 
impure fact, on the assumption that "God" is the name of an individual 
who possesses the Divine Attributes essentially. (Absent this assumption, 
even the proposition that God believed at t1 that p would tum out to be 
pure.) So as yet there is no problem for Ockhamism. 
The problem comes from noting that in the relevant sort of context, if an 
agent can perform an act which is such that if he were to perform it, God 
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would believe at tl that p, then the agent can perform an act which is such 
that if he were to perform it, God would at tl have the property, "believing 
that p." Further, it is my contention that this property is a "temporally 
pure" property. That is, I make a distinction between properties that is par-
allel to the temporally pure/impure distinction among propositions.6 So in 
the relevant sort of context, an agent's so acting that God believed at tl that 
p would require his so acting that God had some temporally pure property 
at tl. And, as above, if an agent can (at some time subsequent to tl) do 
other than he aChIally does, then he can perform some action which is such 
that if he were to perform it, God would have had a different temporally 
pure property at tl from what he actually had. Again, this is all I need for 
my argument against Ockhamism (on the current assumption about 
"God"). The argument is generated by facts about counterfactuals and 
their relationships to "can-claims," together with the distinction between 
pure and impure properties. The basic intuition that drives my argument 
here is that no one has it in his power at a given time t so to act that some 
individual would have had at a time prior to t some temporally pure prop-
erty that he did not actually have. 
An important point that comes out of the above discussion is that the 
argument for incompatibilism, as I interpret it, does not in the first instance 
exploit the impossibility of backward causation. It was perhaps unfortu-
nate that Pike employed the locution, "brings it about that _," which can 
seem to suggest backward causation, where the relevant proposition is 
about the past. Rather, the argument, properly interpreted, exploits the 
fact that no agent can so act that the past would have been different from 
the way it actually was; that is, no agent can perform an act which is such 
that, if he were to perform it, the past would have been different from the 
way it aChlally was. If the (relevant) backtracking counterfactual is true, 
then the associated "can-claim" must be false. Thus a proponent of the 
argument need not be committed to what Gale takes to be problematic 
inference rules concerning "brings it about that _n. 
University of California 
NOTES 
1. Further, any account of the distinction which can do the work it needs 
to do in the arguments concerning the relationship between God's foreknowl-
edge and human freedom must capture the notion of how a more abstract 
proposition (such as one involving quantification) is made true. 
2. John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control 
(Oxford, u.K. and Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 115-117. 
3. For a full development of the argument, see John Martin Fischer, 
"Scotism," Mind 94 (1985), pp. 231-43; and The Metaphysics of Free Will, esp. p. 
63. 
4. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 117-128. 
5. Nelson Pike, "Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder," Philosophical Review 
75 (1966), pp. 369-379. I do not claim that it is obvious that sameness of sense 
of belief between God and human beings requires the assumption. Note, how-
ever, that if one gives up the assumption in the text and accepts some sort of 
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"direct apprehension model" of God's knowledge, then one must countenance 
pervasive backward causation; for a discussion of this point, see John Martin 
Fischer, "Critical Notice of Jordan Howard Sobel, Puzzles for the Will (forthcom-
ing), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 
6. For an attempt at giving an account of this distinction, see John Martin 
Fischer, "Hard-Type Soft Facts," Philosophical Review 95 (1986), pp. 591-60l. 
There are critical discussions in : David Widerker, "Two Forms of Fatalism," in 
J.M. Fischer, ed., God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989), pp. 97-110; and "Troubles With Ockhamism," Journal of Philosophy 
87 (1990), pp. 462-80. For a response to Widerker, including an improved spec-
ification of the distinction, see John Martin Fischer, "Hard Properties," Faith 
and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp. 161-9. 
